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This article examines the Supreme Court's most recent pro-
nouncements on the subject of in personam jurisdiction. The
author analyzes each of the four cases decided during the
Court's last two terms and predicts the impact these decisions
will have on future jurisdictional inquiries. Specifically, the au-
thor discusses (1) the reappearance of the state interest con-
cept; (2) first amendment considerations within the jurisdic-
tional context; (3) a shift toward a balancing of plaintiffs' and
defendants' interests; (4) the propriety of focusing on modern
business practices within the jurisdictional analysis; and (5) a
possible modification in the traditional burden of proof rule.
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 809
II. Keeton v. H ustler M agazine ............................................. 811
III. Calder v. Jones ........................................................ 819
IV . H elicopteros v. H all .................................................... 824
V. Burger King v. Rudzewicz ............................................... 835
V I. C ONCLUSION ...... ............... ........................ ......... 843
I. INTRODUCTION**
During the 1983 and 1984 terms, the Supreme Court of the
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** Some of the matters referred to in this article have been subjected to detailed and
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United States handed down four decisions in the area of personal
or territorial jurisdiction: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.;1 Cal-
der v. Jones;2 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall;3
and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 4 This article will take a criti-
cal look at these opinions and their probable impact on jurisdic-
tional doctrine.
In brief, Keeton followed the traditional "minimum contacts"
rule of International Shoe,6 revitalized the concept of state inter-
est as a relevant factor to be considered within the jurisdictional
equation, and rejected defendants' arguments that plaintiff must
have minimum contacts of her own with the forum state. Calder
came to grips with the intersection of two constitutional doctrines;
namely, the first amendment and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The case also terminated the special treat-
ment more than one circuit had previously accorded the media.6 In
addition, the Court, for the first time, addressed the jurisdictional
reach of the due process clause over corporate employees and
found no reason to treat them any differently from other defen-
dants. Helicopteros, in considering the concept of general jurisdic-
tion after a thirty-two-year hiatus, substituted dated, if not mori-
bund, case law for more recent authorities and, in so doing, ignored
the economic realities of the marketplace post-International Shoe.
Finally, Burger King, decided only one year after Helicopteros,
made an almost 180-degree turn from the narrow focus of
Helicopteros in relying heavily on modern-day business practices.
The decision may also have shifted to the defendant the burden of
showing jurisdiction to be "unreasonable" once a court has found
the defendant to have had purposeful minimum contacts within
the forum state. If that is true, Burger King constitutes a major
change in procedure.
scholarly analysis elsewhere. As a consequence, no attempt will be made to duplicate those
discussions here.
1. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
2. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
3. 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
4. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Holt, 678 F.2d 936 (lth Cir.), reh'g granted on other grounds,
691 F.2d 989 (lth Cir. 1982); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967)
(dictum); New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New
York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964). Contra Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Ad-
ams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d
Cir. 1967).
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II. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine
In the first of the above cases, Kathy Keeton, a New York
State resident, sued Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire for libel.
The United States District Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire dismissed her complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the de-
fendant; the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judg-
ment." The Supreme Court reversed.8 Addressing the court of
appeals's "three concerns," namely, "'the single publication rule,'
New Hampshire's unusually long statute of limitations, and plain-
tiff's lack of contacts with the forum State,"' the Court found all
three wanting.
It has long been the law that where the defendant's contacts
in the forum state are related to the claim, lesser contacts are nec-
essary than in the situation where no such relationship exists.10
The problem for the court of appeals arose from the fact that the
substantive law of libel follows the so-called "single publication
rule," which permits only one action for damages even though the
plaintiff may have suffered damages in several jurisdictions." Be-
cause only a small part of Keeton's damages resulted from the dis-
tribution of copies of Hustler in New Hampshire, the lower appel-
late court deemed that the forum contacts had only a "minimal"' 2
relationship to the entire claim. The Supreme Court agreed that
the contacts of defendant and the forum state had to "be judged in
the light of [the total] claim, rather than a claim only for damages
sustained in New Hampshire,"" and also agreed that the contacts
needed to be of such a nature so as to make it "fair""' to subject
defendant to New Hampshire's jurisdiction. The two courts dif-
fered, however, in interpreting the extent of New Hampshire's in-
terest in providing a forum for this type of action. To the Supreme
Court, the State of New Hampshire had "a significant interest in
7. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1982).
8. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
9. Id. at 1478.
10. See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Anal-
ysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136, 1142-44 (1966) (discussing the Court's evolution of the
concepts of specific and general jurisdiction). Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (activities considered sufficient where cause of action arose out of
those activities) with Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ("substan-
tial" activities considered sufficient where cause of action arose from activities entirely dis-
tinct from the nonresident's activities in the forum state).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1977).
12. 682 F.2d at 34.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 1478.
14. Id. at 1479.
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redressing injuries that actually occurred within the State,"" in-
cluding not only plaintiff's injuries but also the injuries of "the
readers of the statement."'16 In addition, the Court added a some-
what new variation: "New Hampshire also has a substantial inter-
est in cooperating with other States, through the 'single publica-
tion rule,' to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and
damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding."' 7
All of this emphasis on New Hampshire's interest as an ele-
ment of the jurisdictional inquiry seems to have resulted in a bit of
an about-face for the Court. Justice Brennan brought this fact to
the attention of his colleagues.' s He reminded them that the Court
had seemingly laid to rest, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,'9 the state interest factor (which
has had a long and varied history, both pre-dating and post-dating
International Shoe).2 0 In Bauxites, the Court indicated that its
earlier pronouncements on the subject, at least with respect to the
"interstate federalism" of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 2  were no longer valid:
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1480. Earlier, the Court considered the "shared interest of the several states
in furthering fundamental social policies." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98-99 (1978)). For a criti-
cism of this "shared interest" theory, see Lewis, The "Forum State Interest Factor" in
Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33
MERCER L. REv. 769, 801 (1982).
18. Justice Brennan agreed that the defendant's claim-related contacts alone were suffi-
cient to support jurisdiction, but concluded that the state interest factor, relied on in part
by the majority, could no longer be deemed valid after Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1482 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). In Bauxites, the Court held that the defendant was subject to jurisdic-
tion in the absence of any evidence of forim contacts. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See also Lewis,
A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards,
37 VAND. L. REv. 1, 7-9 & n.29 (1984) (discussing the Court's explicit recognition in Bauxites
that the due process question raised by personal jurisdiction is one of individual-not
governmental-rights).
19. The forum state interest factor dates back to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 737
(1878) (Hunt, J., dissenting). See Lewis, supra note 17, at 772-73. It was not until 1916,
however, in Kane v. New Jersey, that the Court found a strong state interest in promoting
safety on its highways, together with the implied consent of the nonresident defendant, to
be dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. 242 U.S. 160 (1916). Professor Lewis traces this
interest as a jurisdictional factor post-International Shoe, concluding that the minimum
contact theory made it "wholly unnecessary to resort to a state interest factor as a make-
weight to support jurisdiction for nonresidents." Lewis, supra note 17, at 781.
20. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See also Lewis, supra note 18, at 3, 7-9; Lewis, The Three
Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 722-26 (1983).
21. 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
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The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due
Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to quarrel with Professor Lewis's
conclusion that this statement, together with Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion in Bauxites,5 sounded the death knell of not only
World-Wide Volkswagen's interstate federalism doctrine, but also
that of the older, related concept of state interest, as well.2 '
And, yet, the majority in Keeton, glibly stated:
But insofar as the State's 'interest' in adjudicating the dispute is
a part of the Fourteenth Amendment due process equation, as a
surrogate for some of the factors already mentioned, see Insur-
ance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, .. we think the inter-
est is sufficient.2 5
But why is a "surrogate" needed? Could not "the factors al-
ready mentioned," namely, "the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation '2 e have justified upholding jurisdic-
tion on their own? Hustler's contacts with the forum were far
greater than minimal, consisting of "the sale of 10 to 15,000 cop-
ies"27 per month, and the connection between those contacts and
the claim could hardly be closer. By reintroducing the state's con-
cern for "redressing injuries that actually occur within the State,"'8
is the decision as to whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over
22. 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10.
23. 456 U.S. 694 (Powell, J., concurring):
Before today, of course, our cases had linked minimum contacts and fair play as
jointly defining the 'sovereign' limits on state assertions of personal jurisdiction
over unconsenting defendants .... The Court appears to abandon the rationale
of these cases in a footnote .... But it does not address the implications of its
action. By eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as a 'sover-
eign' limitation on the power of States - for, again, it is the State's long-arm
statute that is invoked to obtain personal jurisdiction in the District Court -
the Court today effects a potentially substantial change of law. For the first time
it defines personal jurisdiction solely by reference to abstract notions of fair
play.
Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
24. See Lewis, supra note 18, at 9; Lewis, supra note 17.
25. 104 S. Ct. at 1479 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1478 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
27. Id. at 1477.
28. Id. at 1479.
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the defendant made easier? The answer to all of these questions, it
is submitted, is no. If as Bauxites unequivocally stated, in confirm-
ing longstanding constitutional precedents," "the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement" is the due process clause,30
the addition of "state interest" to the existing equation provides
no help. That factor has "neither [denied] jurisdiction when juris-
diction should have been upheld, nor [upheld] jurisdiction when it
should have been denied."31
One of the primary interests of each state must be in making
its courts available, on an impartial and neutral basis, to both
plaintiffs and defendants alike so that the courts may do justice.
But the purpose of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
is certainly no less - to ensure that the court accords each side of
the litigation "fair play and substantial justice. '3 2 If the preceding
sentence is true, then what can the forum state do to add to the
protection of the due process clause? Can a state alter the protec-
tions of the clause by enacting new substantive laws or extending
such rights under the common law? It should be noted that we are
not concerned here with the reach of a state's long-arm statute,
but rather with a state's substantive laws, manifested in its police
29. See Lewis, supra note 17, at 771-74 (arguing that a court can even deem Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) authority for this proposition, despite the consensus that Pen-
noyer's emphasis on state sovereignty puts it more in the "state interest" camp). Interna-
tional Shoe itself, which in formulating the minimum contacts doctrine made no reference
to state interest, supports Professor Lewis's position. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98, 100 (1978) (refusing to subject the defendant father to
jurisdiction in the face of unfairness to him although California's interest in child-support
cases was termed "substantial" (despite that State's lack of a "specific jurisdictional [long-
arm] statute")); Lewis, supra note 17, at 785-87, 800.
30. 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
31. Lewis, supra note 17, at 807. One case that necessarily comes to mind is Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., where the Court appears to have relied solely on state
interest as the basis for jurisdiction over nonresidents who had an interest in a common
trust fund. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Admittedly, this case is considered most often with respect
to the "notice," rather than the "power," prong of personal jurisdiction; but this, of course,
does not answer the question as to why the Court did not address the power concept (as it
obviously did in International Shoe) more particularly. At any rate, commentators have
agreed that the Court could have.upheld jurisdiction in Mullane under any of several other
theories: (1) "jurisdiction by 'necessity,'" (Lewis, supra note 17, at 788); (2) "a variant on
the standard 'relatedness' basis of jurisdiction" (Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08
(1977); Lewis, supra note 17, at 788-89); or (3) the minimum contacts doctrine itself by an
analysis that the "trust. . .established minimum contacts between the absent beneficiaries
and the State of New York" (Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on
State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S. CT. REv. 77, 108 (P. Kurland ed.)).
32. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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power."3 We are dealing here with procedural, not substantive, due
process. Clearly, each state can supplement the federal due process
clause by permitting suits against nonresidents to the full extent
that the federal constitution allows3 or, alternatively, states are
free to restrict such actions to a point or points short of that line. 5
This kind of state control has apparently never been questioned so
long as the long-arm statute is not unconstitutional on its face or
as applied. But to compare this kind of state control with the no-
tion that a court should permit a state to extend its jurisdictional
reach by way of substantive enactments is akin to comparing ap-
ples with oranges. The two simply have no connection.
How can a court permit State X to give its citizens a greater
constitutional right than State Y merely because State X has cre-
ated a certain substantive right which State Y citizens do not en-
joy? If the defendant had absolutely no contacts in State X, then
clearly, regardless of forum state interest, no jurisdiction could at-
tach." Again, if the contacts were minimal, but the claim was un-
related to the contacts, there would also be a failure of jurisdic-
tion.3 7 But if a related claim coexists with minimum contacts, it
would appear that both States X and Y should have identical juris-
diction - even if the plaintiff's claim in State Y were based on the
statutory right created by State X.38
By referring to the forum state's interest, the Court implied
that in a close hypothetical case, where the contacts may be mini-
33. Professor Redish felt that the only proper state interest in litigation between pri-
vate parties was "in protecting state citizens from the burdens of litigating in a distant
forum." Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evalua-
tion, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1139 (1981). Nevertheless, Professor Redish suggests two state
interests which he feels should affect the traditional minimum contacts standard; each inter-
est involves choice of law considerations. Id. at 1141-42. But the Court has made clear on at
least three occasions over the last 17 years, the most recent of which is Keeton itself (see
infra note 42 and accompanying text), that jurisdiction and choice of law are two disparate
and distinct issues. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of
the United States.")
35. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952) ("The suggestion that
federal due process compels the State to open its doors ... has no substance.")
36. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
37. Id. at 318; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952)
(discussing the requisite level of contacts necessary to satisfy due process requirements
where the cause of action is distinct from those contacts).
38. "[T]he issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 215 (1977).
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mal at best and the relationship between these contacts and the
claim merely conjectural, the substantive law interest of the forum
state could tilt the decision in favor of a jurisdictional finding. 9
But such a tilt would be improper when not dealing with the rights
of states such as here, but rather the rights of private parties are
involved.40 It is not at all clear why, in the above circumstances, a
plaintiff should have greater due process rights over a defendant in
State X than he would in State Y. To put it another way, why
should a defendant in State X have fewer due process rights than
he would in State Y? Furthermore, the only issue is whether the
litigation will ultimately take place in State X or elsewhere, most
likely the defendant's state of domicile. Assuming that the courts
of both states will be neutral and impartial, State X's substantive
law should be irrelevant to this decision. In this respect, Keeton
represents an undesirable return to the pre-Bauxites period.
The second issue considered in Keeton was New Hampshire's
six-year statute of limitations, which made New Hampshire the
only forum left in the United States where plaintiff could bring her
action.4' Because of this, the court of appeals deemed plaintiff's
action in New Hampshire to be unfair.42 As the Supreme Court
indicated, however, this is not a question of jurisdiction, but is in-
stead a question of choice of law.4' Furthermore, "such concerns
should [not be permitted to] complicate or distort the jurisdic-
tional inquiry."44 Not only do statute of limitations issues not arise
until after the court has established jurisdiction, they have abso-
lutely nothing to do with forum state contacts either."
The final point of departure between the two opinions con-
cerned the plaintiff's contacts in New Hampshire. The court of ap-
peals apparently determined that plaintiff's lack of contacts pre-
cluded jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court expressly rejected this
notion, providing bench and bar with some much needed clarity on
the subject. Referring to its 1952 decision in Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.,46 where the plaintiff had no relationship
to the forum state, the Court concluded that although plaintiff's
39. See Lewis, supra note 17, at 807 (Professor Lewis says this has never happened.).
40. A fortiori, when the state is the plaintiff, it should not have greater rights against
an individual or corporate nonresident defendant. See Lewis, supra note 17, at 824 & n.311.
41. 104 S. Ct. at 1480.
42. 682 F.2d 33, 35-36 (1982).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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residence "is not, of course, completely irrelevant to the jurisdic-
tional inquiry," it nevertheless "is not a separate requirement, and
lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the ba-
sis of defendant's contacts. 4 7 Reiterating the well-known formula
of the tripartite relationship "among the defendant, the forum and
the litigation,' 48 Keeton provides that "plaintiff's residence may
well play an important role in determining the propriety of enter-
taining a suit against the defendant in the forum. '49 This is due to
the fact that "plaintiff's residence .. may, because of defendant's
relationship with the plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with
the forum." 50 These statements appear to indicate that while
plaintiff's nonresidence will not defeat otherwise sufficient jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant, plaintiff's residence may cause
insufficient contacts to be "enhanced" so that they meet constitu-
tional standards. In other words, in a close case, plaintiff's resi-
dence could tip the scales in favor of jurisdiction.
Cited as examples of such enhancement are Calder v. Jones1
and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 52 The only prob-
lem with the Court's use of these two cases as examples is that
they are worlds apart. In Calder, no enhancement was necessary
due to the magnitude and nature of defendant's contacts. In fact,
references to plaintiff's contacts in that case appear to be mere
obiter dictum. 3 McGee, on the other hand, is a perfect example of
such enhancement because the contacts of defendant insurance
company in that case were as minimal as may be found in any case
where the Supreme Court has upheld jurisdiction.5 4 The use of Mc-
Gee in recognizing the significance of plaintiff's residence as a fac-
47. 104 S. Ct. at 1481.
48. Id. at 1478 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
49. Id. at 1481.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
52. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
53. See infra note 69.
54. An Arizona life insurance company insured one Franklin, a California resident, in
1944. In 1948, the company replaced this policy pursuant to a reinsurance agreement with
defendant, International Life Insurance Company. Franklin continued to pay premiums to
International until his death in 1950. McGee, also a California resident, was the beneficiary
of this policy and, when International refused to pay her claim, she sued the company in a
California state court where she received a default judgment. When she subsequently sued
on this judgment in Texas, the Texas courts refused to enforce it. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld jurisdiction relying on defendant's contacts in California,
that State's "manifest interest in providing ... redress for its citizens," and the fact that its
"residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance
company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable." 355 U.S. at 223.
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tor in the jurisdictional analysis makes good sense.
The Court has, of course, discussed this factor before in
Kulko,56 World-Wide Volkswagen," and Rush,57 but never to the
extent it has in Keeton. Whether Keeton's clearer articulation of
the role of plaintiff's residence represents a step forward in juris-
dictional analysis, however, is not entirely certain. It may be that
the Court is only now explaining in greater detail one of the bases
for its decision in McGee. Even so, it is certainly a worthwhile clar-
ification of McGee in this respect. For even though the Court re-
ferred to plaintiff's interest in the above cases, it appears, and cor-
rectly so, that the interest was not sufficiently "enhancing" to alter
the results.
If this reference to plaintiff's contacts in Keeton does go fur-
ther than mere clarification of McGee and, instead, heralds a slight
refinement of the jurisdictional calculus, then it must be greeted
with applause. For plaintiff's interest in forum selection, whether
based on residence, other contacts with the forum state, or no con-
tacts at all, deserves recognition. At the same time, we should not
confuse plaintiff's interest with the forum state's interest, which, as
indicated above,58 would not seem to merit consideration. McGee
expressly recognized the interest of the forum state in determining
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, but was not as explicit
with respect to the interest of the plaintiff. In fact, the two con-
cepts, discussed almost as one in that case, seemed to be merged
into the former.59 Keeton, although reaffirming the interest of the
state, has clearly given further impetus to plaintiff's interests than
heretofore, even if only by way of dictum. This could well signify a
much desired and more equitable balancing of plaintiffs' and de-
fendants' burdens in the future, a balancing which has met with a
good deal of support from commentators,60 and, somewhat more
55. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
56. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
57. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
58. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
59. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson seems to confirm this by citing McGee
as an example of state interest, while citing Kulko for plaintiff's interest. 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980).
60. Professor McDougal has stated that the Court has "focus[ed]-at least since Han-
son-solely on the due process protection of defendants. The Court thus has ignored the
possibility that a plaintiff may also be deprived of due process of law" when he cannot "as a
practical matter ... pursue the defendant either to the defendant's home state or to the
state where the contacts engendering the controversy occurred." McDougal, Judicial Juris-
diction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1, 9 (1982). Professor
Redish suggests "consider[ing] the relative burdens a denial of jurisdiction would impose
[Vol. 39:809
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indirectly, from some courts."'
III. Calder v. Jones
In Calder v. Jones,6 2 Shirley Jones, a well-known entertainer
residing in California, brought a libel action against four defen-
dants: the National Enquirer; a local distributor; Calder, the presi-
dent and editor of the magazine; and South, a reporter employed
by the Enquirer. The two individual defendants moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and, although the trial court indi-
cated that the actions of such defendants would ordinarily be in-
sufficient to subject them to jurisdiction, it appeared to rely pri-
marily on the first amendment in granting the motion."3 The
California Court of Appeals reversed, 4 holding that "petitioners
intended to, and did, cause tortious injury to respondent in Cali-
fornia, '"" and that first amendment considerations were not rele-
vant to the issue of jurisdiction.6
In affirming the decision of the California Court of Appeals, 67
the Supreme Court began by endorsing that court's "'effects
test.' "' Put simply, the test permits the exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident who "cause[s] an effect in a state by an act
upon the plaintiff." Redish, supra note 33, at 1138. Professor Jay put it this way: "The
fourteenth amendment would protect not merely the defendant from an unfair forum, but
also would stand as a source for plaintiffs' rights, recognizing their entitlement to a reason-
able site for the lawsuit." Jay, "Minimum Contacts" As A Unified Theory of Personal Ju-
risdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 454 (1981). See also Lewis, supra note 17, at
816 n.269 (arguing that plaintiff's interest is not adequately accounted for within the juris-
dictional analysis if it is deemed to hinge on plaintiff's forum residence or citizenship); De-
velopments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 924 (1960) (discuss-
ing the desirability of balancing the plaintiff's and the state's interests against the
inconvenience to the defendant).
61. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d
378, 385, 143 N.E.2d 673, 677 (1957).
62. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
63. The Supreme Court opinion stated that "the superior court surmised that the ac-
tions of petitioners in Florida, causing injury to respondent in California, would ordinarily
be sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction over them in California." Id. at 1485.
The California Court of Appeal, however, quoted the superior court in its "memorandum of
decision" as having stated that: "The totality of such contacts, [South's and Calder's] in this
Court's view, are [sic] insubstantial." Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 131, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 825, 827 (1982).
64. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1982).
65. 104 S. Ct. at 1485.
66. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 132, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (1982).
67. The Supreme Court of California denied review. Jones v. Calder, 2 Civ. No. 65403
(Cal. 1983), reproduced in Joint Appendix to Briefs to the United States Supreme Court at
122 (No. 82-1401), 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
68. 104 S. Ct. at 1486 n.6.
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done elsewhere."6 This rule is neither surprising nor shocking; in
fact, it makes good sense and has long been espoused by commen-
tators70 and numerous courts.7' Use of the "effects" approach is
somewhat different in this case, however, due to the nature of the
defendants. Instead of the usual defendant who commits an act in
a foreign state, here the perpetrators of the act (the writing of the
allegedly libelous article) were two nonresident employees. They
wrote the article for their corporate employer, which not only had
authorized the article, but which had extensive contacts with Cali-
fornia. On the other hand, one of the employees, Calder, appar-
ently had insufficient 0hysical contacts with California to support
an independent finding of jurisdiction. 72 Therefore, if the Court
were to uphold jurisdiction over Calder, it had to reverse either the
state appellate court's conclusion on the contacts issue or affirm on
the causation issue. Defendants contended that California courts
could not obtain jurisdiction over them because they had not acted
as individuals, but had rather acted "in their respective capacities
as officer and employee of the corporate defendant. 7 3 A reporter
in California first made this argument; the California court re-
jected it then, 4 and again here below. 75 The Supreme Court
treated the argument similarly. In affirming, the Court ruled for
the first time that nonresident employees (at least within the pub-
lishing business), both at executive and lower levels, could be sub-
ject to jurisdiction in their individual capacities. With respect to
Calder, this result is not startling, because he was president and
editor of the Enquirer. Defendant South, however, was not an ex-
ecutive; he was merely a reporter. Both petitioners made the anal-
ogy of the "welder employed in Florida who works on a boiler
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971). Generally, it would seem
that the quantity of contacts, at least in a libel case, would have some bearing on jurisdic-
tion under the effects test. For example, a single magazine or newspaper article in the forum
state would undoubtedly not meet the minimum contacts standard. In this case, defendant
corporation's weekly circulation of its magazine in California totaled about "600,000 ...
copies, almost twice the level of the next highest State." 104 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
70. Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Ju-
risdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249 (1959); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresi-
dent Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of Am., 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969); Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 4332, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968).
72. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 133-34, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 829. This was not true of defendant
South, however. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 135, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
73. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 135, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
74. McGuire v. Brightman, 79 Cal. App. 3d 776, 145 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1978).
75. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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which subsequently explodes in California, "76 but the Court,
through Justice Rehnquist, stated that this analogy "does not
wash"' 7 because the welder would have been guilty, at most, of
"mere untargeted negligence. '7 8 On the other hand, petitioners' ac-
tions here were "intentional, . . . allegedly tortious, . . . and ex-
pressly aimed at California."' 9
Two observations seem pertinent here, but they will be limited
to a discussion of South alone, because if it is appropriate to sub-
ject him to jurisdiction in California, then a fortiori, jurisdiction
over Calder would be proper as well. First, South's contentions
about the welder, who works on a boiler in State A, which later
explodes in State B, deserved a better answer. The Court at-
tempted to distinguish this hypothetical by stating that because
the welder's actions would be tantamount to "untargeted negli-
gence," jurisdiction would not attach. But this response fails to
meet the essence of petitioner's argument. Many factories design
their products for specific markets. In such a situation, our welder
would probably be aware of the fact that all of the boilers on which
he was working were destined for sale in State B.80 In such a case,
under Calder, it seems clear that he, too, would be subject to juris-
diction in State B. But this is not necessarily bad. Obviously, our
welder would be subject to a negligence suit in State A, so why not
in State B? No good reason comes to mind, unless it could be ar-
gued that the welder could not "reasonably anticipate being haled
into court"'81 in State B. Because our happy welder probably never
considered being haled into court even in State A, this argument is
without substance.
Second, the impact of subjecting a low-level employee to juris-
diction in a distant state will undoubtedly be de minimis in the
usual manufacturing and commercial case. Bringing in the welder
would not only complicate the run-of-the-mill negligence case,82
76. 104 S. Ct. at 1487.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. It should perhaps be noted that the effects test is employed "frequently. . . in the
field of products liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 comment a
(1971).
81. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citing Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
See infra note 200.
82. In addition to proving the defendant company liable for its negligence, the plaintiff
would have to prove this particular employee's responsibility for that particular widget-
not always an easy task.
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but would seldom, if ever, increase either the amount or the likeli-
hood of collection on the judgment. The effect of Calder on report-
ers, commentators, editorial writers, and the like, however, may
well be more pronounced. Although it is unlikely that the amount
of judgment or possibility of recovery will be vastly improved,s in
the case of reporters and others similarly situated, as compared to
factory workers, the individualistic and professional nature of the
reporter's job gives him greater control over, and thus increased
responsibility for, his work product. This necessarily requires a
greater reliance by the publisher-employer on the competency and
integrity of such employees than exists in the manufacturer-fac-
tory worker relationship. Moreover, it is certainly realistic for a
publisher to expect the reporter to bring to its attention anything
contained in the article that might result in litigation. Failing that,
it is entirely reasonable for the publisher to demand contribution
from the reporter toward any judgment awarded against the pub-
lisher.8 4 In this respect, then, it is probable that Calder will have a
greater impact on employees within the media industry than it will
within the industrial and commercial fields.
The Court finally resolved the second and by far the more sig-
nificant issue decided in Calder, namely, whether different juris-
dictional standards are justified for the media as contrasted with
all other defendants. In rejecting a double standard, the Court
agreed with the majority of circuit courts"5 and the few commenta-
tors who have addressed the question.86 The problem, as exempli-
fied by cases like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 7 and New York
83. It is possible, of course, that under certain circumstances, the plaintiff might re-
cover punitive damages from the author of the article, as opposed to the employer, but this
presumably would be the rare case.
84. This will be especially so where the reporter has not been completely honest with
his publisher about the factual basis for, or the sources of, the article, and when this lack of
candor has led the employer to publish something it otherwise would not have.
85. See supra note 5.
86. Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill A Mocking Word, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 342, 351 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction];
Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases,
34 U. Cm. L. REV. 436 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutional Limitations];
Case Notes, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 726 (1967); Comments on Recent Cases, 52 IowA L.
REV. 997, 1034 (1967). Contra Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction Meets the Press: First
Amendment Considerations in Jurisdictional Analysis, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1982).
87. 376 U.S. 254, 264 n.4 (1964). The parties argued the jurisdictional issue here, but
the Court refused to decide it on the ground that the defendant had entered a general ap-
pearance. Id.
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Times Co. v. Connor,88 arises from defendants' fears "that they will
receive an unfair trial in the plaintiff's home forum." 9 If such fears
were realized in the form of large jury verdicts and punitive dam-
age awards, then the media, especially newspapers and magazines,
might well decide to restrict distribution to less hostile states or
tend to be more cautious in the content of their articles to the det-
riment of first amendment freedoms. Most commentators" have
nevertheless concluded that the substantive law, 91 the right of
removal, 92 and restrictions in long-arm statutes themselves9 3 ade-
quately protect the media from unfair trials. Other alternatives
also exist.9 4 The Supreme Court clearly agreed with the commenta-
tors, stating that "[t]he infusion of [first amendment] considera-
tions [into the jurisdictional analysis] would needlessly complicate
an already imprecise inquiry."9 Concluding that "the potential
chill on protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel
and defamation actions" had already been "taken into account"'96
in substantive law decisions,97 and that "in other contexts" the
Court had refused "to grant special procedural protections to de-
fendants in libel and defamation actions,"9 8 the Court took less
than half a page to reject the notion that first amendment rights
demanded stricter jurisdictional standards. Perhaps the Court
could be faulted for not at least considering such an important
constitutional question in greater depth;99 the decision, neverthe-
88. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
89. See Comment, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 86, at 437 n.4.
90. See supra note 86.
91. See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 86, at 451-52; Comment, Consti-
tutional Limitations, supra note 86, at 358-61.
92. See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 86, at 359-60. Once a case has
been removed, of course, there is always the possibility of a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404 (1976). Id. at 360 n.98. General Westmoreland originally filed his suit against CBS in
the United States District Court of South Carolina, but the case was later transferred to the
Southern District of New York. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at 34, col. 1 (D.S.C. Nov. 18,
1982).
93. See Comment, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 86, at 448.
94. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984) (hold-
ing that appellate courts should review the record independently with respect to the facts
constituting "actual malice" in libel cases); see also Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98
HARv. L. REv. 87, 165, 173 (1984) (suggesting that courts "award attorneys' fees to libel
defendants who prevail against frivolous claims") [hereinafter cited as Leading Cases].
95. 104 S. Ct. at 1487.
96. Id. at 1488.
97. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
98. Id.
99. See Leading Cases, supra note 94, at 173 (criticizing the Court, not for its holding,
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less, is eminently correct. Undoubtedly, New York Times 00 and
Gertz'01 have made it a good deal more difficult to sue public
figures for libel. Bose"'0 has further reinforced this substantive law
because it requires stricter appellate review of the record in such
cases. The negative effect of these decisions on in terrorem suits
cannot be denied. In view of these cases, more restrictive jurisdic-
tional standards for libel cases would only present an additional
hurdle that could well preclude a legitimate claimant from ever
bringing his action. 0 s Furthermore, Connor's chilling-effect argu-
ment0 4 may well rest "on questionable assumptions"'05 with re-
spect to the ultimate actions by publishers.
One explanation for the Court's relatively brief treatment of
this issue is that there has already been a good deal of commentary
on the subject, most of which supports the Court's position. 0 6
More importantly, however, the holding simply makes good sense.
IV. Helicopteros v. Hall
In the third and clearly most troublesome of the four cases,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,01 the survivors
and representatives of four United States citizens brought a
wrongful death suit against Consorcio/Williams-Sedco-Horn
(WSH), Bell Helicopter Co. and Helicopteros (Helicol) in the Dis-
trict Court of Harris County, Texas. 08 The four decedents were
but for its "failure to address the first amendment seriously").
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
101. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
102. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
103. See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 86, at 362-63.
104. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966).
105. See Leading Cases, supra note 94, in which the commentators state:
These arguments, however, are by no means unproblematic. The self-censorship
argument rests on questionable assumptions about the way publishers think; it
may well overstate the extent to which purely economic factors influence pub-
lishers' editorial decisionmaking at the expense of journalistic objectives. The
restriction-of-circulation argument, by contrast, relies upon questionable eco-
nomic assumptions. Restriction of circulation will be rational only when the
marginal costs of distributing a publication in a forum exceed the revenues de-
rived from that forum; thus, only publishers with relatively small circulations in
a state are likely to withdraw their publications from it. Certainly the expansion
of long-arm jurisdiction has not deterred other businesses from vigorously ex-
tending their sales territories.
Id. at 172 (footnotes omitted).
106. See supra note 86.
107. 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
108. Id. at 1871.
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employees of WSH. While on a helicopter flight toward the con-
struction site of a pipeline in Peru, 09 the employees were killed in
the regular course of business. Because helicopters were needed "to
move personnel, materials, and equipment into and out of the con-
struction area," 1 0 WSH employed Helicol, "a Colombian corpora-
tion . . . engaged in the business of providing helicopter transpor-
tation for oil and construction companies in South America.""'
WSH representatives had negotiated a contract with the chief ex-
ecutive officer of Helicol in Houston and a formal contract was
later executed in Peru, some time after Helicol actually began op-
erations for the consortium." 2
Defendant Helicol specially appeared to object to personal ju-
risdiction, the court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to
trial against the three defendants. The court ultimately entered
judgment against Helicol alone in an amount exceeding one million
dollars.13
On appeal to an intermediate appellate court, the judgment
was reversed on the ground that the trial court lacked in personam
jurisdiction over Helicol. 1 4 The Supreme Court of Texas, with
three justices dissenting, reversed on rehearing, "5 after initially af-
firming." 6 Because the Supreme Court of Texas had interpreted its
long-arm statute to reach "as far as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment permits,"'"17 the sole issue remaining
109. Under Peruvian law, a non-Peruvian company could not construct a pipeline. As a
result, a consortium was formed of Williams International Sudamericana, Ltd., a Delaware
corporation; Sedco Construction Corporation, a Texas corporation; and Horn International,
Inc., a Texas corporation. According to the Supreme Court: "Consorcio is the alter-ego [sic]
of a joint venture named Williams-Sedco-Horn (WSH)." 104 S. Ct. at 1870. In this article,
the consortium will be referred to as "WSH" or "the consortium."
110. 104 S. Ct. at 1870.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1871. The court directed verdicts in favor of the other two defendants, WSH
and Bell Helicopter Co. Id. at 1871 n.6.
114. 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
115. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982).
116. 25 TEx. SuP. CT. J. 190 (1982).
117. 104 S. Ct. at 1871 (citing 638 S.W.2d at 872). The majority opinion by the Su-
preme Court of Texas seems to have misconceived the role of the state long-arm statute in
the jurisdictional scheme. The Texas statute, article 2031b, requires that the claim against
the nonresident defendant arise out of the defendant's business in Texas. 638 S.W.2d at
877-78 (Pope, J., dissenting) (construing TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon
1972)). As a consequence, the statute is congruent with the federal due process limitations
only with respect to "arising out of" claims. Because the foregoing words act as a state
limitation on any claims under the statute, it does not matter that the Supreme Court of
Texas construed the statute to go as far as the United States Constitution allows. See Loui-
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before that court was one of constitutional law. In an eight to one
decision, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed." 8
The court characterized the issue of jurisdiction as one of
"general," as opposed to "specific," jurisdiction"1 9 and refused to
deal with the latter concept.120 Thus constrained, Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, examined Helicol's contacts in
Texas and concluded that they failed to meet the standard re-
quired for a finding of general jurisdiction.' Stating that Helicol
had no place of business in Texas and had never been licensed to
do business there,"2 2 the Court gave short shrift to "[tihe one trip
to Houston by Helicol's chief executive officer for the purpose of
negotiating the transportation-services contract with Consorcio/
WSH."'12  Neither was the court influenced by the fact that the
consortium paid Helicol with checks drawn on a Texas bank. In
subjecting Helicol to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Texas had
relied primarily "on the purchases and the related training
trips.' 24 The Supreme Court disagreed "with that assessment, "125
reaching back for support to a 1923 decision, Rosenberg Brothers
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.' The Court emphasized that "mere
purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals,' 27 could not be
sufficient for the assertion of general jurisdiction. Nor could the
Court deem the training of Helicol's personnel in connection with
such purchases "a significant contact.' 2 8
SELL, HAZARD & TArr, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 315-16 (5th ed. 1983). Put another way, the
statute permits all "arising out of" claims to go to the federal constitutional limits, but does
not allow any claims against nonresidents that do not arise out of defendant's contacts in
Texas. There may well be some basis of jurisdiction with regard to such claims, but article
2031b is not one of them.
118. 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
119. Id. at 1872-73. "General jurisdiction" refers to the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant where the cause of action sued upon does not arise out of or is unre-
lated to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. "Specific jurisdiction," on the other
hand, refers to the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident where the cause of action does
arise out of or is related to that defendant's contacts with the forum state. See id. at 1871
nn.8-9 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10).
120. The majority opinion concluded that "[a]ll parties to the present case concede that
respondents' claims against Helicol did not 'arise out of,' and are not related to, Helicol's
activities within Texas." Id. at 1872-73 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 1874.
122. Id. at 1873.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1874.
125. Id.
126. 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
127. 104 S. Ct. at 1874.
128. Id.
[Vol. 39:809
INTERNATIONAL SHOE'S RECENT PROGENY
As in Keeton, Justice Brennan authored a separate opinion in
Helicopteros,1" 9 although this time in dissent. Specifically, he took
issue with the majority's conclusions that: (1) defendant had insuf-
ficient contacts to be subject to general jurisdiction; (2) the Rosen-
berg case could be valid authority in 1984; and (3) the issue before
the Court was limited to a question of general jurisdiction only,
rather than involving both specific and general jurisdiction. 130
By viewing the jurisdictional issue only from the standpoint of
general jurisdiction, the Court forced itself to deal with this ques-
tion for the first time" 1 since its 1952 decision in Perkins.' The
facts in that case were as follows:
During the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands, the
president and general manager of a Philippine mining corpora-
tion maintained an office in Ohio from which he conducted ac-
tivities on behalf of the company. He kept company files and
held directors' meetings in the office, carried on correspondence
relating to the business, distributed salary checks drawn on two
active Ohio bank accounts, engaged an Ohio bank to act as
transfer agent, and supervised policies dealing with the rehabili-
tation of the corporation's properties in the Philippines. In
short, the foreign corporation, through its president, 'ha[d] been
carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited,
part of its general business,' and the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion over the Philippine corporation by an Ohio court was 'rea-
sonable and just. 1"3
After reciting the above facts in Perkins and reviewing
Helicol's contacts in Texas, the Court, in an amazing tour de force,
looked to Rosenberg'34-as precedent. No mind that the Rosenberg
decision is over sixty years old, that it was decided under pre-In-
ternational Shoe doctrine, that the "nature and quality" as well as
the quantity of contacts were in stark contrast to those in
Helicopteros; no, the Court managed to resurrect a dead case and
a dead doctrine, while dealing a body blow to jurisdictional law
129. 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. The Court had discussed Perkins on previous occasions, namely, in Keeton and
Calder, but these cases were examples of specific jurisdiction, and, thus, the Court had no
reason at the time of those decisions to determine what the limits of its holding in Perkins
were.
132. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
133. 104 S. Ct. at 1872 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
438 (1952)).
134. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
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from which it may take years or decades to recover.83 Let us first
look at the Rosenberg facts: defendant, Curtis Brown, was "a small
retail dealer in men's clothing and furnishings in Tulsa,
Oklahoma," whose only contacts in New York were limited to buy-
ing "a large part of the merchandise' ' 3 in New York for resale in
his Tulsa store. In contrast, Helicol committed all of the following
acts in Texas:
a. Purchased substantially all of its helicopter fleet in
Texas;
b. Did approximately $4,000,000 worth of business in Fort
Worth, Texas, from 1970 through 1976 as purchaser of equip-
ment, parts and services. This consisted of spending an aver-
age of $50,000 per month ... ;
c. Negotiated in Houston, . . . [a] contract to provide the heli-
copter service involving the crash leading to this cause of ac-
tion.. .;
d. Sent pilots to ...Texas to pick up [Bell] helicopters ...
and fly them . . . to Columbia [sic];
e. Sent maintenance personnel and pilots to Texas to be
trained;
f. Had employees in Texas on a year-round rotation basis;
g. Received roughly $5,000,000 under the terms and provisions
of the contract in question here which payments .. .were
made from [a bank] . . . in . . .Texas;. .37
Curtis Brown purchased goods in New York, period. Neither
the Supreme Court nor lower court'3 8 opinions disclosed the
amount of his expenditures. Helicol, on the other hand, bought
more than four million dollars worth of goods in Texas, spending
an average of fifty thousand dollars per month for some six consec-
utive years. In addition, it regularly sent pilots to Fort Worth to
pick up helicopters, it sent maintenance personnel and pilots to
135. Despite its eight to one vote, it might not be unreasonable to conclude that the
Court never mentioned the real reason for its decision. In an amicus curiae brief, the De-
partment of Justice argued "that the ability of American firms to compete in world trade
markets could be adversely affected because foreign corporations might be dissuaded from
purchasing American products if the mere purchases of products in the United States-
together with training in the United States as part of the purchase agreement-is sufficient
to subject foreign businesses to the jurisdiction of American courts for causes of action to-
tally unrelated to their purchases. Such a result would be detrimental to the government's
efforts to promote the export of American products." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 1-2, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
136. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923).
137. 638 S.W.2d at 871-72.
138. 260 U.S. 516 (1923); 285 F. 879 (W.D.N.Y. 1921).
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Texas for training, and had employees in that state "on a year-
round rotation basis." 3 9 Moreover, it negotiated a large service
contract in Houston, resulting in over five million dollars in sales.
In other words, the activities carried on by Helicol in Texas were
neither irregular nor casual, but were rather "continuous" and
"substantial.' ' 4 0 Unlike Curtis Brown, Helicol was not merely a
purchaser of goods, but was also a seller of services on a grand
scale.'' Summing up, Helicol's business dealings with Texas in-
volved buying, selling, negotiating, and training of personnel over a
six-year period on a regular monthly basis, totaling some nine mil-
lion dollars.
Looking at the law in Rosenberg, however, provides an even
dimmer perspective. International Shoe, decided in 1945, marked
a new departure in personal jurisdiction. As Professor Kurland has
stated: "The International Shoe case . . . served rather to destroy
existent doctrine than to establish new criteria for the Supreme
Court and other courts to follow."' 4 Part of the doctrine that
Chief Justice Stone destroyed in his opinion was the "presence"
theory of jurisdiction, a theory that the Court in Rosenberg fol-
lowed rigidly. The Court now attempts to justify its step backward
in time in Helicopteros by reference to the fact that the holding in
Rosenberg was "acknowledged" and "not repudiate[d]" in Interna-
tional Shoe." 3 But this statement is not exactly accurate. It is true
that the Court acknowledged Rosenberg, and that it was not repu-
diated. That portion of Chief Justice Stone's opinion that refers to
Rosenberg, however, simply catalogued past cases in which pres-
ence and consent were the bases for deciding jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants. The opinion did not attempt to reevaluate
such cases under the new standards. Rather, it appears that the
Court was attempting to show that the former theories failed to do
139. 638 S.W.2d at 871.
140. 326 U.S. at 318.
141. See Knudsen, Jurisdiction Over the Travel Industry: A Proposal to End Its Pref-
erential Treatment, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 101, 117-18 (1983). Although this article is primar-
ily aimed at the travel industry, its conclusions are equally valid with respect to any seller of
services who successfully solicits sales in another state or country.
142. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Ju-
risdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 569, 586 (1958). See also Developments in the
Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAgv. L. REV. 909, 923 (1960) ("Mr. Chief Justice Stone
discarded the presence and consent theories as mere legal conclusions that the assumption
of jurisdiction was reasonable. In place of these he offered a new standard: whether the
corporation had certain 'minimum contacts' with the state such that the maintenance of the
suit would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.").
143. 104 S. Ct. at 1874.
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an adequate job. In fact, the Court's citation of Rosenberg for the
proposition that "the commission of some single or occasional acts
of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation
or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon
the state authority to enforce it,' 1 4 clearly indicates that the de-
fendant's actions in Rosenberg at most constituted only "occa-
sional acts."" 514 Had the Court decided Helicopteros at the time of
Rosenberg in 1923, it can hardly be doubted that the Court would
have considered Helicol to be present in Texas in view of its vast
number of business activities and its large amount of dollar volume
in that state.
The majority opinion has another elemental defect. In using
Perkins as the criterion for judging whether general jurisdiction
exists, the Court seems to have confused the factual situation in
Perkins with doctrine. Obviously, in order to obtain general juris-
diction over a corporate defendant it is not now necessary to sue
the corporation in its state of domicile, nor was it necessary in the
immediate pre-International Shoe period. Despite the Supreme
Court's zigging and zagging on this issue during the first quarter of
this century, this rule seems to have ultimately won the day."16
For, immediately preceding the aforementioned reference to the
Rosenberg case in International Shoe, Chief Justice Stone
concluded:
[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities."4
Moreover, in upholding jurisdiction over the defendant corporation
in Perkins, the majority opinion relied on this very quotation. 1 8 In
concluding that there was no basis for subjecting Helicol to juris-
diction in the general sense, the Court in effect failed to give the
International Shoe standards an appropriate reading. First, these
standards permit jurisdiction only where the suit will not "offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ,19 The
144. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
145. Id.
146. Compare Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) with Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921) and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259,
115 N.E. 915 (1917).
147. 326 U.S. at 318.
148. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446.
149. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
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task for the Court was to decide - using International Shoe
guidelines and not the outdated "presence" doctrine - whether
Helicol's contacts in Texas were "so substantial and of such a na-
ture as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities. ' 150 Second, the ref-
erence to "mere purchases" by Helicol in Texas was patently
wrong. As indicated above, 151 and as the Supreme Court of Texas
clearly set forth, Helicol sold approximately five million dollars
worth of services to WSH. To characterize Helicol as a mere pur-
chaser, when its actual sales were in the neighborhood of five mil-
lion dollars, utterly miscomprehends the facts of the case. This
fundamental misunderstanding obviously had some part in the
Court's reliance on Rosenberg, where the defendant made no sales
in the forum state. Of course, if the Court considered Helicol's
sales to WSH irrelevant and therefore of no signficance to the issue
of jurisdiction, the Court was not only wrong on the merits, 52 but,
by neglecting to even refer to these significant contacts, it also
failed to comply with those high standards of methodology the Su-
preme Court of the United States is expected to establish and
meet. Third, the Court not only omitted any discussion of the ben-
efits Helicol had derived from its transaction of business in Texas,
but also did not address Justice Brennan's incisive arguments, to-
wit:
As active participants in interstate and foreign commerce take
advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities offered by
the various States, it is only fair and reasonable to subject them
to the obligations that may be imposed by those jurisdictions.
And chief among the obligations that a nonresident corporation
should expect to fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that
is significantly affected by the corporation's commercial
activities. 5 8
Finally, the doctrine of International Shoe is not set in mar-
ble; it has continued to evolve, as is implicitly recognized in the
phrase "International Shoe and its progeny.1' 54 The minimum
(1940)).
150. 326 U.S. at 318.
151. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
152. See Comment, Personal Jurisdiction In The Post-World-Wide Volkswagen Era-
Using a Market Analysis to Determine the Reach of Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. L. REV. 155
(1984) (suggesting the use of dollar revenues as a factor in the jurisdictional analysis).
153. 104 S. Ct. at 1877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
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contacts theory originated in 1945, but there have probably been
hundreds of appellate decisions since that time, refining, modify-
ing, and clarifying the theory. Over twenty-five years ago, Justice
Black recognized this process when he stated:
[M]any commercial transactions touch two or more States and
may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great in-
crease in the amount of business conducted by mail across state
lines. At the same time modern transportation and communica-
tion have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to de-
fend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity. 15
In World- Wide Volkswagen, Justice White acknowledged these
changes in this way: "The historical developments noted in McGee,
of course, have only accelerated in the generation since that case
was decided." 56
Here, in 1984, the Court had a chance to continue to develop
the law of general jurisdiction, as last expressed in Perkins, in light
of these fundamental changes and the realities of the market place.
It missed this great opportunity, though, and in relying so heavily
on Rosenberg, took the state of the law back sixty years.
With respect to specific jurisdiction, 157 the Court took the easy
way out by refusing to give it any consideration. " This aspect of
the case merits some discussion. First, as Justice Brennan stated,
the majority had "remove[d] its decision from the reality of the
actual facts presented for our consideration.' 5 9 Whether the ques-
tion of specific jurisdiction was actually before the Court is not
crystal clear.'10 Second, both opinions of the Supreme Court of
Texas discussed the issue of whether the causes of action arose out
of Helicol's activities in Texas, but came to opposite conclusions.' 6'
Third, in the second and final opinion of that court, the majority
(formerly the dissent) decided that it was "unnecessary" to con-
sider whether the claims arose out of Helicol's contacts in Texas
because the contacts were so "numerous" as to amount to the es-
155. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
156. 444 U.S. at 293.
157. See supra note 119.
158. 104 S. Ct. at 1872-73 & n.10.
159. Id. at 1878 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Justice Brennan stated in dissent that "while the respondents' position before this
Court is admittedly less than clear, I believe it is preferable to address the specific jurisdic-
tion of the Texas courts because Helicol's contacts with Texas are in fact related to the
underlying cause of action." Id. at 1877-78 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. 25 TEx. S. CT. J. 190, 193-95 (1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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tablishment of defendant's "presence" there. 162 The dissent, how-
ever, contended that the only basis for upholding jurisdiction (due
to the narrow long-arm statute) was to find that the causes of ac-
tion arose out of defendant's Texas activities and that such was
not the case.16 Fourth, when a plaintiff wins a million dollar ver-
dict against a nonresident defendant, only the most unequivocal
concession by plaintiff that he did not rely on specific, as well as
general, jurisdiction should preclude the Court from considering
the issue. Alternatively, because it was a constitutional issue, the
Court should, on its own motion, have ordered reargument on that
point alone.1 6
4
Examination on the merits into the question of whether
Helicol would have been subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas
leaves little doubt. Because the Supeme Court of Texas interpreted
its long-arm statute to reach as far as the United States Constitu-
tion permits,1 65 the issue of whether the causes of action in this
case arose out of defendant's activities in Texas necessarily would
have become a matter of federal constitutional law. It is worth not-
ing that the Supreme Court has never decided this precise issue.
This is true even in Perkins, where there was no discussion of the
conclusion that "[t]he cause of action sued upon did not arise in
Ohio and does not relate to the corporation's activities there."166
Of course, lower courts have faced this question on occasion.
16
7
Justice Brennan contended that the Court should have consid-
ered whether there was "any distinction between controversies that
'relate to' a defendant's contacts with the forum and causes of ac-
tion that 'arise out of' such contacts. '"16 In finding Helicol's con-
tacts with Texas to be "sufficiently related to the underlying cause
162. 638 S.W.2d at 872.
163. Id. at 877.
164. Obviously, in the usual case, the Court should accept concessions by counsel, but
such concessions should be clear-cut. More importantly, in constitutional cases, the Court's
duty is not only to the litigants, but to the concept of the rule of law.
165. See supra note 117.
166. 342 U.S. at 438.
167. Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 1968);
GuLlett v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 417 F. Supp. 490, 497 (M.D. Tenn. 1975):
In the case at bar, the cause of action cannot fairly be said to be entirely unre-
lated to defendant's activities within this state. An injury occurring on a flight
which was contracted and paid for within this state cannot be said to be wholly
unrelated to the sale of the ticket. There is an obvious logical nexus between
defendant's exploitation of the Tennessee market and an injury occurring on a
flight which was contracted for as a result of the exploitation.
168. 104 S. Ct. at 1877-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of action, to make it fair and reasonable for the State to assert
jurisdiction over Helicol,"' 16 9 Justice Brennan seems to have opted
for a standard he apparently believed to be somewhat broader
than the "arising out of" limitation referred to in International
Shoe.1 0
This concern on his part appears to be misplaced because the
Court, in one form or another, used the terms "related to," "arising
from," "arise out of," and "connected with," in conjunction with a
nonresident defendant's activities in the forum state.17 1 More sig-
nificantly, the Court used them all interchangeably. Perkins, al-
though concluding that no connection existed between the cause of
action and defendant's activities in the state, supports the lan-
guage of International Shoe. 7 2 So, too, does McGee, where Jus-
tice Black stated: "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that
the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection
with that State.'17
3
If there is no legal distinction between the terms "arising out
of" and "related to," then the next question is whether the causes
of action in Helicopteros were in any way related to its extensive,
multimillion dollar, long-term contacts in Texas. A review of the
facts reveals that the four men killed in the helicopter crash were
employees of WSH, a consortium headquartered in Texas; the ac-
cident occurred during the course of business; Helicol rendered the
helicopter services, valued at five million dollars, on a regular basis
pursuant to a contract negotiated with WSH in Texas; Helicol pur-
chased almost all of its helicopters in Texas, sent its maintenance
personnel and pilots there for training, kept employees in that
state year-round and paid them from a Texas bank. 74 The ques-
tion would seem to answer itself.
There is no question that Bell could have sued Helicol in
Texas over any dispute arising out of their extensive business deal-
ings. The same is true of WSH with respect to any claims it may
have had that were connected to its multimillion dollar service
contract negotiated in Texas.175 If WSH could have sued Helicol in
169. Id. at 1878 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. 326 U.S. at 319.
171. Id. at 317-21.
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
173. 355 U.S. at 223.
174. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
175. A few courts have held that the negotiation of a contract in the forum state consti-
tutes the transaction of business and is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon its courts, even
when formal execution has taken place elsewhere. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales
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Texas over the service contract, how are the services rendered pur-
suant to this contract any less related to the claims of the deceased
employees of WSH?
In fact, it appears that decedents' causes of action were as suf-
ficiently connected to Helicol's helicopter purchases and personnel
training in Texas as they were to its sale of services there. Both of
Helicol's contacts meet the arising out of, or relatedness test of In-
ternational Shoe and its progeny. Moreover, with respect to the
sale of services, the negotiation of the large contract in Texas
should not be deemed the primary contact. Far more important is
the economic reality of Helicol's sale of approximately five million
dollars worth of services to a Texas consortium. The Supreme
Court of California specifically articulated this "economic activity"
standard at an early date176 and later reaffirmed it in Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,' where it stated that it would deem
nonresident manufacturers to be engaged in:
economic activity within a state as a matter of 'commercial actu-
ality' whenever the purchase or use of its product within the
state generates gross income for the manufacturer and is not so
fortuitous or unforeseeable as to negative the existence of an in-
tent on the manufacturer's part to bring about this result. 1 8
Following this logic, a nonresident contractor's sale of services
should reach the same jurisdictional result, 7e at least where, as
here, the nonresidents have "solicited business in Texas by sending
a representative to Houston to negotiate with Williams-Sedco-
Horn' 8 0 and a relationship exists between that sale and the forum
state. Moreover, it would seem that the contacts between Helicol
and Texas were so extensive and far-reaching that Helicol could
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 8'
V. Burger King v. Rudzewicz
The last, but in no way the least of these decisions, Burger
Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971); Liquid Carriers Corp. v. American
Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1967).
176. Empire Steel Corp. of Texas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502, 17
Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961).
177. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
178. Id. at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
179. See Knudsen, supra note 141.
180. 638 S.W.2d at 874 (Campbell, J., concurring).
181. 444 U.S. at 297 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). See infra note 200.
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King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,5 2 began as an ordinary breach of con-
tract and trademark infringement action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida by a Florida
franchisor against two of its Michigan franchisees. 183 Both defen-
dants, Rudzewicz and MacShara, argued that the court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over them "because they were Michigan resi-
dents and because Burger King's claim did not 'arise' within the
Southern District of Florida.1 84 The court rejected these conten-
tions, defendants answered,' 8 ' and the court ultimately entered
judgment after trial in favor of plaintiff on each of its claims. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed for lack of personal jurisdiction, with one judge dis-
senting.188 After granting certiorari,8 the Supreme Court reversed,
six to two. 88
The relevant facts are as follows:
Rudzewicz and MacShara jointly applied for a franchise to Bur-
ger King's Birmingham, Michigan district office in the autumn
of 1978. Their application was forwarded to Burger King's
Miami headquarters, which entered into a preliminary agree-
ment with them in February 1979. During the ensuing four
months it was agreed that Rudzewicz and MacShara would as-
sume operation of an existing facility in Drayton Plains, Michi-
gan. MacShara attended the prescribed management courses in
Miami during this period . . . and the franchisees purchased
$165,000 worth of restaurant equipment from Burger King's
Davmor Industries division in Miami. 89
Disagreements between the parties began "[e]ven before the
final agreements were signed" and were "negotiated both with the
182. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
183. Jurisdiction was based on diversity for the contract 'claim and on 28 U.S.C. §
1338(a) for the trademark claim. 105 S. Ct. at 2180.
184. Id.
185. Defendants also counterclaimed against Burger King, but they did not prevail on
the merits of this claim at trial. Id.
186. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505 (lth Cir. 1984), rev'd sub. nom.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). Rudzewicz alone prosecuted the
appeal, while MacShara dropped out of the case. Moreover, by virtue of a compromise be-
tween Rudzewicz and Burger King, the appeal was limited to the breach of contract claim.
105 S. Ct. at 2180 n.11.
187. Burger King appealed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, but the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal and granted certiorari. 105 S. Ct. at 2181.
188. 105 S. Ct. 2174. Justice Powell did not participate in the case; Justices Stevens and
White dissented.
189. Id. at 2179 (citation omitted).
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Birmingham district office and with the Miami headquarters. '" 190
After the Miami office made certain concessions to the franchisees,
the parties executed the franchise contracts. The terms of the con-
tract required the franchisees to make payments directly to Miami.
When payments were late, the Miami office mailed out notices of
default and once again discussions took place among the franchis-
ees, the district office, and headquarters. After prolonged negotia-
tions by mail and telephone between the franchisees and Miami,
Burger King's Miami headquarters terminated the franchise.
In upholding jurisdiction, the trial court relied on Florida's
long-arm statute, which permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state
resident on a "cause of action arising" from the breach of "a con-
tract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the con-
tract to be performed in this state."' 91 The district court further
concluded that the statute as applied did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals limited its inquiry solely to the due process issue
because the parties had stipulated, for purposes of the appeal, that
the reach of the long-arm statute was sufficient to include
Rudzewicz.192 In reversing, the appellate court emphasized that
Rudzewicz not only "lacked notice of the possibility of suit in Flor-
ida [but] he was financially unprepared to meet its added costs." '193
As a consequence, "jurisdiction. . .would offend the fundamental
fairness which is the touchstone of due process.
19 4
Justice Brennan's majority opinion wasted no time rejecting
the "'fair warning' requirement"1 95 of the court below in favor of
Hanson v. Denckla's "purposeful availment" 1' and Keeton's
closely-related "'purposefully directed' activities" concepts.1 97
Recognizing that a defendant must be said to have reasonably an-
ticipated "being haled into court"1 98 in a state where he "'deliber-
190. Id.
191. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984).
192. 105 S. Ct. at 2181 n.12.
193. 724 F.2d at 1512.
194. Id. at 1513.
195. 105 S. Ct. at 2182. This term apparently originated in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). It is closely allied, if not synonymous, with Justice
Marshall's phrase in the majority opinion: "expect to be haled before a Delaware court." Id.
at 216. The majority subsequently quoted this phrase verbatim in Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) and, with a minor change in wording, in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
196. 105 S. Ct. at 2183.
197. Id. at 2182.
198. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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ately' has engaged in significant activities. . . or has created 'con-
tinuing obligations' between himself and residents of the
forum,""' the majority opinion is patently correct in its construc-
tion of World-Wide Volkswagen's well-known dictum.2 °0 More-
over, the fact that "the defendant did not physically enter the fo-
rum State"20' 1 cannot defeat jurisdiction in circumstances such as
these. Presence may "enhance a potential defendant's affiliation
with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit
there," but in "modern commercial life . . . a substantial amount
of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications
across state lines. '20 2 The test, therefore, is not physical presence,
but whether the "commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully di-
rected' toward residents of another State."203
Returning to fundamental principles, the Court stressed that
once it is found that the defendant has "purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State," a second level of in-
quiry may be appropriate, namely, "whether the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial
justice.' ,,204 At this stage, relevant considerations include:
'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's interest in ad-
judicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiffs interest in obtaining con-
venient and effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's in-
terest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,'
and the 'shared interest of the several States in furthering fun-
damental substantive social policies.' 0 5
Furthermore, the balancing of these factors may permit a court to
uphold jurisdiction "upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts
than would otherwise be required. '20 6 Additionally, the Court
stated that once a court has made the initial determination that
199. 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
200. The entire sentence reads: "Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connec-
tion with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there." 444 U.S. at 297. For the history of this jurisdictional factor, see supra note 195.
The specific references to "defendant's conduct" and "defendant's connection with the fo-
rum State," as well as defendant's requirement that his anticipation be "reasonable," make
it clear that a court must always employ an objective basis for defendant's "anticipation."
See Lewis, supra note 18, at 20.
201. 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
205. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
206. 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
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the defendant has "purposefully . . . directed his activities at fo-
rum residents . . . he must present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable. ' 20 7 The Court suggests as an example of such a com-
pelling case, "litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that
a party would be at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his
opponent."20 8
The exact import of the foregoing language is not crystal clear.
The Court seems to be saying that if it appears that the defendant
has engaged in purposeful minimum contacts within the forum
state, two alternatives are possible. First, the quantity, quality, and
nature of such contacts may be sufficient for a finding of jurisdic-
tion without more. 00 In that situation, there is no necessity to ex-
amine the "other factors." But where the contacts are inadequate
by themselves to obtain jurisdiction, the second alternative comes
into play: examination into those elements to determine whether
subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction would be fair and just.
This level of inquiry seems to require the tribunal to balance the
five interests listed. It is, however, at this point that the defendant
"must present a compelling" case against jurisdiction, suggesting
that where the balance is even, the tribunal will uphold jurisdic-
tion. This may be merely another way of saying that once the court
has established a defendant's purposefully directed minimum con-
tacts, the burden shifts to the defendant to prevail at the second
stage.210 In light of the past general rule that placed the entire bur-
den of proving jurisdiction on the plaintiff,21 it remains to be seen,
207. Id. at 2185.
208. Id.
209. The Court stated that "these contacts may be considered in light of other factors."
Id. at 2184 (emphasis added). It did not say they must be considered for there will be no
need to take them into account when it becomes obvious that jurisdiction over the defen-
dant, on the basis of such contacts alone, will "comport with 'fair play and substantial jus-
tice.'" Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
210. Although this would represent a major procedural change in jurisdictional law, it is
similar in theory to recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the law of employment dis-
crimination. Admittedly, these cases rely on congressional intent, but that is irrelevant here.
Once plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). By analogizing
plaintiff's proof that defendant has "purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum State" as a prima facie case, to be rebutted only by defendant's "present[ation of] a
compelling case. . . that jurisdiction [would be] unreasonable," the Court comes close to, if
it does not in fact adopt, such a position. 105 S. Ct. at 2184-85.
211. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188 (1936); Taylor v.
Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967); Northcross v. Joslyn Fruit
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without more precise articulation, whether the Court meant to af-
fect such a tremendous change in the law. Nevertheless, it can be
argued with conviction that once defendant has intentionally cre-
ated minimum contacts within the forum state, there is no need to
continue the bias in his favor. As Judge Friendly noted in Buckley
v. New York Post:
There has been a 'movement away from the bias favoring the
defendant,' in matters of personal jurisdiction 'toward permit-
ting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant come to him' when
there is a sufficient basis for doing so.
[I]t would not be difficult to extrapolate from the Mc-
Gee decision and opinion a general principle that the due pro-
cess clause imposes no bar to a state's asserting personal juris-
diction .. .in favor of a person within its borders who suffers
damage from the breach of a contract the defendant was to per-
form there or a tort the defendant committed there. Once we
free our minds from traditional thinking that the plaintiff must
inevitably seek out the defendant, such a doctrine would not
seem to violate basic notions of fair play ... '
The Court went on to clarify the due process significance of a
contract between the parties, a matter that was a source of "divi-
sion among lower courts."' 13 Adopting the better view, the Court
concluded that where a contract is the sole contact with the forum
state, it cannot support jurisdiction over the nonresident con-
tracting party.214 Rejecting "'mechanical' tests 2 1' and "conceptu-
alistic. . . theories," ' 6 as it has in the past, the Court instead took
the:
'highly realistic' approach that recognizes that a 'contract' is 'or-
dinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business
negotiations with future consequences which themselves are the
real object of the business transaction. It is these factors -
prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along
Co., 439 F. Supp. 371, 376 (D. Ariz. 1977).
212. 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at
1128).
213. 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
214. Id. at n.21. (citing Brewer, Jurisdiction in Single Contract Cases, 6 ARK. LrrrL.E
ROCK L.J. 1, 7-11, 13 (1983); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When
is a Contract a Contract?, 61 B.U.L. REV. 375, 384-88 (1981).
215. 105 S. Ct. at 2185 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945)).
216. Id. (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943)).
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with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of
dealing - that must be evaluated in determining whether the
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within
the forum.2 7
Rudzewicz had voluntarily sought "a Florida corporation for
the purchase of a long-term franchise and the manifold benefits
that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide organiza-
tion.1118 Upon execution of the agreement, he had subjected him-
self to "the long-term and exacting regulation of his business from
Burger King's Miami headquarters."21 ' Moreover, his failure to
make the franchise payments directly to the Miami headquarters,
as required by the agreement, and his misuse of plaintiff's "trade-
marks and confidential information. . caused foreseeable injuries
to the corporation in Florida. '220
Key to the decision is the Court's emphasis on the fact that all
real power at Burger King resided solely in the Miami office. All
disputes of any consquence 221 between franchisee and franchisor
were subject to the "decisionmaking authority . . . vested in the
Miami headquarters," while the district office in Michigan "served
largely as an intermediate link between the headquarters and the
franchisees. "222
The Court also provided a new perspective on choice-of-law
agreements between parties. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had concluded that such provisions were irrelevant, citing
Hanson v. Denckla as authority,22 but this analysis "ignored" de-
fendant's having "'purposefully invoked the benefits and protec-
tions of a State's laws.' ",224 Explaining, Justice Brennan added:
"Although such a provision standing alone would be insufficient to
confer jurisdiction, we believe that, when combined with the 20-
year interdependent relationship Rudzewicz established with Bur-
ger King's Miami headquarters, it reinforced his deliberate affilia-
tion with the forum State and the reasonable foreseeability of pos-
217. Id. at 2185-86 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 2186.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. "When problems arose over building design, site-development fees, rent computa-
tion, and the defaulted payments, Rudzewicz and MacShara learned that the Michigan of-
fice was powerless to resolve their disputes and could only channel their communications to
Miami." Id. at 2187.
222. Id. at 2186-87.
223. 724 F.2d at 1512 n.10.
224. 105 S. Ct. at 2187.
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sible litigation there. 2 25
The Court noted two other points raised by the court of ap-
peals. First, the Court paid little attention to the disparity of
wealth between Rudzewicz and Burger King. In fact, in negating
this as a factor, the Court relegated this discussion to a mere foot-
note.226 Second, the Court likewise put to rest the lower court's
fear that a finding of jurisdiction in this case might lead to a
proliferation of suits "to collect payments due on modest personal
purchases '227 from out-of-state consumers. Reminiscent of an ear-
lier "not . . .while this Court sits '228 dictum, the majority opinion
made clear that this decision in no way created any "talismanic
jurisdictional formulas."22 ' Stressing that " 'the facts of each case
must [always] be weighed' in determining whether personal juris-
diction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice,' "230
the Court concluded that "these dangers are not present in the in-
stant case.
'231
Justice Stevens, in dissent, quoted extensively from the major-
ity opinion of the appellate court below,2 3 2 and found "a significant
element of unfairness" in subjecting Rudzewicz to suit in Flor-
ida.28 The major flaw in Justice Stevens's analysis, like the Court's
analysis in Helicopteros, is that it completely ignores the realities
of the modern commercial world in two respects. First, it fails to
appreciate the roles of the telephone and the mail in negotiating
today's business deals. Physical presence is no longer necessary for
the parties to iron out even the most minute details of a contract.
Second, a high percentage of large corporations still make not only
policy, but specific decisions, at headquarters, despite the fact that
their networks include regional and district offices. The majority
opinion recognized this fact of life, both in its decision in favor of
jurisdiction as well as in a footnote indicating that for "different
decisionmaking structures" the result might be the opposite.
234
Essentially, the relationship of Rudzewicz and Burger King
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2188 n.12.
227. Id. at 2189.
228. "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
229. 105 S. Ct. at 2189.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2190.
232. Id. at 2190-91 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1511-13
(l1th Cir. 1984)).
233. 105 S. Ct. at 2190.
234. Id. at 2189 n.28.
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consisted of a business arrangement between the franchisees in
Michigan and the corporate headquarters in Florida. Contract ne-
gotiations leading to the consummation of the relationship took
place primarily between Rudzewicz and the Miami office, the
Miami office made precontract concessions to Rudzewicz,
Rudzewicz made payments to the Miami office, the Miami office
handled disputes between Rudzewicz and the company, and that
office carried out the final act of termination. To conclude that the
franchisee had not "engaged in significant activities . . . or . . .
created 'continuing obligations' "235 with Burger King in Florida
simply flies in the face of the facts.
VI. CONCLUSION
How will these four cases shape the ever-developing minimum
contacts doctrine? Obviously no definitive answer is possible, but
some consequences seem more probable than others. Keeton
should, in close cases, prove helpful in giving lower courts greater
leeway to balance plaintiffs' interests against defendants' interests.
Admittedly, the Court spoke in terms of "plaintiff's residence" act-
ing as a possible "enhance[ment]" of "defendant's contacts with
the forum, "'26 but as Keeton was not a resident of New Hamp-
shire, it would seem a small step for lower courts to give greater
credence to the spirit of that statement than to a begrudging literal
reading. Moreover, Keeton provides a new approach toward under-
standing McGee as a decision which actually relied more on plain-
tiff's interest in upholding jurisdiction than on the interest of the
state.
The return of the state interest concept, after its apparent de-
mise in Bauxites, will continue to afford lower courts a rationale
for subjecting nonresident defendants to their jurisdiction when
they need a makeweight. As a practical matter, however, this
should be of little moment for, as Professor Lewis has concluded,
the forum state interest factor has never led to a finding or denial
of jurisdiction when such decisions could not be supported on
other grounds.2 7 If Professor Lewis's observation continues to be
true, then this aspect of Keeton will do nothing more than muddy
the conceptual waters and, presumably, we can all live with that.
235. Id. at 2184 (quoting Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950))
(citation omitted).
236. 104 S. Ct. at 1481.
237. See Lewis, supra note 17, at 807.
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On the other hand, Keeton used strong language in dismissing the
statute of limitations issue, to-wit: that "choice of law concerns"
should not be allowed to "complicate or distort the jurisdictional
inquiry. ' 8  This could well have a negative effect on the substan-
tive law concerns of the forum state and ultimately lead to that
concept's demise, 239 leaving only the forum state's "interest in re-
dressing injuries that actually occur within the State." 40 In time,
that too might pass away.
Calder's main impact will naturally be on the media, which
now will be subject to the same rules as all other defendants, be
they commercial, industrial, or individual. Both courts and liti-
gants will have to deal with the usual contacts questions without
any complicating first amendment baggage. In fact, we may find
that together Calder and Keeton may allow a relatively small num-
ber of plaintiffs to sue in their home states when heretofore this
would have been impossible. Does this portend an opening of the
floodgates in libel suits? Hardly, for as the Court emphasized, de-
fendants will be able to find protection in the substantive law as it
now stands, and, together with the kind of protection afforded by
Bose,'24 1 it might work to inhibit frivolous suits.
2412
Because the most disturbing of the cases, Helicopteros, did
not concern itself with the law of specific jurisdiction, it should not
have any direct effect on that aspect of the minimum contacts the-
ory. Nevertheless, its retreat into the past to resurrect doctrines
long considered dead will undoubtedly result in all manner of pre-
International Shoe cases finding their way into defendants' briefs
in the next few years. It is to be hoped that these "authorities" do
not also make their way into court opinions. Its influence on the
future of general jurisdictional concepts, though, may well be dev-
astating. The Court's refusal to even consider the real world of
business and commerce, including the role of a multimillion dollar
purveyor of services to a forum buyer, clearly bodes ill.
Finally, we come to the last, and very possibly the most impor-
tant, case of the quartet, Burger King. By looking at the economic
effects of defendant's actions in the forum state, rather than on
physical presence and "conceptualistic theories," and by focusing
on the realities of the modern-day business world, the Court may
238. 104 S. Ct. at 1480.
239. See Redish, supra note 33.
240. 104 S. Ct. at 1479.
241. See supra note 94.
242. See Leading Cases, supra note 94, at 173 n.70.
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have, quietly and indirectly, undone some of the damage created
by Helicopteros. Moreover, if the Court has actually shifted the
burden from plaintiff to defendant once the trial court is satisfied
that "defendant [has] purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum State,"24 then the Court will have wrought a
most significant, as well as salutary, procedural change.
243. 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
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